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Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, P.R. China 
 
 
Abstract 
 
For a traffic network with fixed demand of heterogeneous users in terms of their different 
values of time (VOT), the system performance can be measured either in time unit by the 
total system travel time (in short, system time), or in monetary unit by the total system travel 
cost (in short, system cost). Thus we have two different objectives for network optimization, 
i.e. to minimize system time and to minimize system cost, which naturally gives rise to a 
bi-objective minimization problem. A Pareto optimum of this bi-objective optimization 
problem represents a bi-criteria system optimum for network optimization in the sense that, at 
each Pareto optimum, neither system time nor system cost can be further reduced without 
increasing the other one. In this paper we prove that any Pareto optimum can be decentralized 
into multi-class user equilibrium by positive anonymous link tolls. We then bound the system 
performance gap when optimized by the two different criteria. Specifically, we provide 
answers to the following questions: When system time is minimized, how far could the 
corresponding system cost deviate from its minimum value? Conversely, when system cost is 
minimized, how far could the corresponding system time deviate from its minimum value? 
More generally, how far can the system time and system cost at a given bi-criteria Pareto 
optimum deviate from their respective single-criterion based system optimum? 
 
Keywords: User heterogeneity, system optimum, Pareto optimum, traffic equilibrium, 
networks  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of value of time (VOT) plays a pivot role in road pricing analysis as it describes 
how users make tradeoffs between money and time in response to road toll charges. 
Conventional network user equilibrium (UE) model typically assumes that users’ VOT are 
identical, i.e. homogeneous users. With homogeneous users, the first-best congestion pricing 
theory, namely the theory of marginal cost pricing is well established in general networks for 
fixed and elastic travel demand. However, it is well known that travelers may value travel 
time differently, depending on their income levels or travel purposes, and thus heterogeneous 
users with different VOT have to be considered. In the presence of user heterogeneity, various 
network equilibrium models are developed by assuming either a discrete set of VOT for 
several distinct user classes or a continuously distributed VOT across the whole population 
(e.g. Leurent, 1993; Marcotte and Zhu, 2000; Mayet and Hansen, 2000; Nagurney, 2000a). 
Also, the optimal pricing problems for heterogeneous users with discrete or continuous VOT 
distributions are investigated extensively (e.g. Dial, 1999a,b; Yang and Zhang, 2002; Yang 
and Huang, 2004). 
 
In traffic networks with users having different VOT, the system performance can be measured 
either in time unit or in cost (monetary) unit, and the two measures are in general mutually 
inconsistent with each other. In particular, for the case of fixed travel demand, the system 
performance can be measured either in time unit by the total system travel time (in short, 
system time), or in monetary unit by the total system travel cost (in short, system cost). From 
an economic viewpoint, system cost is a more appropriate system disutility measure when 
users value travel time differently. Nonetheless, system time is a traditional measure of 
system performance in transportation engineering context, and in the presence of multiple 
user classes, system time is still a proper measure of the environmental effect of traffic, i.e. 
the total system travel time roughly determines the total gas emission of vehicles (in this 
respect, one has to acknowledge the paradox demonstrated by Nagurney (2000b) and Yin and 
Lawphongpanich (2006) that an improvement in travel time might paradoxically increase 
traffic emission). Thus both system time and system cost are meaningful criteria for 
evaluating system performance. Yang and Huang (2004) examined the multi-class 
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multi-criteria (cost versus time) network equilibrium and system optimum problem in a 
network with a discrete VOT distribution and fixed travel demand. They studied the 
cost-based and the time-based system optimization (SO) problems separately. That is, they 
studied the minimization of system cost without consideration of system time, and then 
studied the minimization of system time but ignored system cost. 
 
In this paper, we propose to consider the two criteria for system optimization simultaneously. 
Specifically, we adopt a discrete VOT distribution model with fixed travel demand, and 
introduce a bi-objective minimization problem of system time and system cost. Using the 
theories of multi-objective optimization, we identify a Pareto optimal solution set and the 
corresponding objective value set (the Pareto optimal frontier) in our bi-objective 
optimization problem. Each point on the Pareto optimal frontier is a Pareto optimum where a 
bi-criteria system optimum is established in the sense that neither system time nor system 
cost can be further reduced without increasing the other one. After establishing the bi-criteria 
Pareto optimum, we then examine the question of whether or not we can always find positive 
anonymous link tolls (the same amount of toll levied on each link for all user classes) to 
decentralize a Pareto system optimum. We provide a positive answer to this question by 
rigorous analysis. Note that, in our study context we have to consider a pricing scheme with 
anonymous link tolls, because users differ from one another in VOT only, which is 
observationally indistinguishable, and thus toll differentiation across user classes is 
unrealistic and difficult to implement in reality. 
 
Our subsequent concern in this paper is the system performance discrepancy between the 
time-based and the cost-based SO cases. System time and system cost are both weighted 
summations of the travel times of all user classes, and thus differ from each other only to a 
bounded extent. We explore the extent to which the system performance measures differ 
between the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. Specifically, we answer the following 
questions. When system time is minimized at the time-based SO, how far could the 
corresponding system cost deviate from its minimum value achieved at the cost-based SO? 
Conversely, when system cost is minimized at the cost-based SO, how far could the 
corresponding system time deviate from its minimum value achieved at the time-based SO? 
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More generally, how far can the system time and system cost at a given bi-criteria Pareto 
optimum deviate from their respective single-criterion based system optimum? We show that 
the Pareto optimal system time and cost achieve their maximum deviations from optimum 
when the other objective is optimized. We also establish a meaningful upper bound of the 
product of the two maximum deviations, which can be solely determined by users’ VOT 
distribution.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides preliminaries on the multi-class 
network optimization and pricing problems. Section 3 introduces the bi-criteria Pareto 
optimum concept, and proves that any Pareto optimum can be supported as multi-class UE by 
positive anonymous link tolls. Section 4 bounds the system performance discrepancy between 
the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 5. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries on multi-class network optimization and pricing problems 
 
Let  ,G N A  denote a transportation network, with a set of nodes N  and a set of links A , 
together with a set of origin-destination (OD) pairs .W  We consider separable link travel 
time function   ,  a at v a A , i.e. travel time on a link depends on the flow on that link only. 
The link travel time function  a at v , a A , is assumed to be monotonically increasing with 
av . We consider a discrete set of user classes corresponding to the groups of users with 
different socio-economic characteristics, such as income level. Let M  denote the set of such 
user classes, and m  0m  , be the average VOT for users of class .m M  Let mwd .  
0mwd  , be the travel demand of user class m M  between OD pair ,w W  wR  the set of 
all simple paths connecting OD pair w W , and mrwf  the flow of user class m  on path 
.wr R  The flow mav  by user class m M  and the total aggregate flow av  on link a A  
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can be expressed in terms of path flows as follows: 
,  ,  
w
m m
a rw ar
w W r R
v f a A m M
 
      (1) 
m
a a
m M
v v

  , a A  (2) 
where 1ar   if route r  uses link a  and 0 otherwise. For simplicity, we denote vectors as 
 , , ,mrw wf r R w W m M   f , ( , )av a A v , and ( , , )mav a A m M  Mv . 
 
In the presence of multiple user classes with different VOT, the system travel disutility can be 
measured either in time unit (time-based disutility or total system travel time) by 
 ( ) ( ) ma a a a a a
a A a A m M
T t v v t v v
  
     (3) 
or in cost or monetary unit (cost-based disutility or total system monetary cost) by 
 β ( ) mm a a a
a A m M
C t v v
 
    (4) 
Clearly, both the time-based and the cost-based system disutilities can be regarded as 
weighted sums of the travel times of all user classes in the network. The former has a uniform 
weighting factor equal to unity, while the latter has non-uniform weighting factors equal to 
the VOT of respective user classes. As said earlier, system cost C  is more meaningful for 
economists and system time T  is usually used by engineers; both T  and C  are 
meaningful criteria for network optimization. 
 
For simplicity, let   be the feasible set of path flows defined as 
 : ;  0; ,  
w
m m m
rw w rw
r R
f d f w W m M

          f  (5) 
With the definition of T  and C , the time-based SO problem is formulated as 
    min  = a a a
a A
T t v v 
f f  (6) 
and the cost-based SO problem is formulated as 
    min  mm a a a
a A m M
C v t v  
 f f  (7) 
The system optimal flows given by the above SO problems are generally different from the 
 
Final version submitted to Transportation Research Part B for publication on 11 September 2008 
6 
equilibrium flows in the absence of toll pricing, because each user tries to minimize her own 
travel time. Thus congestion pricing has to be introduced to decentralize an SO or other 
second-best target flow pattern into (or support it as) a multi-class UE flow pattern. That is, a 
tolling system can alter the generalized travel disutility of links and paths faced by each class 
of users, and thereby induce new multi-class UE flow patterns, which are exactly the target 
(SO or other second-best) flow patterns. 
 
Let au  denote the toll charged on link a A  for all user classes and  ,au a A u  be the 
vector of all link toll charges. With a toll scheme u  implemented, the generalized travel 
time ,tmrwc  for a user of class m  traveling along route wr R  between OD pair ,w W  is 
defined as (money is converted into equivalent travel time according to the user class-specific 
VOT, and the superscript ‘t’ stands for time): 
  ,t ,  ,  ,  m arw a a ar w
a A m
uc t v r R w W m M

          (8) 
The corresponding generalized travel cost ,cmrwc  is defined as (time is converted into money, 
and the superscript ‘c’ stands for cost): 
   ,c ,  ,  ,  mrw m a a a ar w
a A
c t v u r R w W m M

        (9) 
With a toll scheme u  implemented, the time-based UE conditions can be written (in time 
unit) as 
   ,tmaa a ar ar w
a A a A m
ut v
 
      , if  0,mrwf   ,  ,  wr R w W m M    (10) 
   ,tmaa a ar ar w
a A a A m
ut v
 
      , if  0,mrwf   ,  ,  wr R w W m M    (11) 
and the cost-based UE conditions are (in monetary unit) 
   ,cmm a a ar a ar w
a A a A
t v u
 
       , if  0,  ,  ,  mrw wf r R w W m M     (12) 
   ,cmm a a ar a ar w
a A a A
t v u
 
       , if  0,  ,  ,  mrw wf r R w W m M     (13) 
where ,tmw  and ,cmw  are the minimum travel disutility in time and monetary units, 
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respectively, between OD pair w W  by users of class ,m M  i.e.,  ,t ,tmin
w
m m
w r R rwc  , 
 ,c ,cmin
w
m m
w r R rwc  , and ,c ,tm mw m w    . Clearly, the disutility unit used (time or cost) does 
not affect the UE conditions or the equilibrium flows, i.e. the time-based and the cost-based 
UE conditions are equivalent to each other. 
 
It is well known (e.g. Yang and Huang, 2004) that the multi-class UE problem can be 
formulated as the following equivalent minimization problem: 
  
0
1min d
av
m
a a a
a A a A m M m
t v u   
   f  (14) 
Observe that objective function (14) is strictly convex in aggregate link flow v  for 
monotonically increasing link travel time function  a at v , but linear in class-specific link 
flow Mv . Thus, under a given tolling system u , the equilibrium link flow by user class Mv  
is generally not unique (neither is the UE path flow f ), while the aggregate UE link flow v  
is unique. Since v  is unique, the system time T  at equilibrium given by (3) is unique. The 
uniqueness of system cost C  at equilibrium is not obvious but can be shown below. 
 
Multiplying both sides of (12) and (13) by equilibrium path flow mrwf  and summing over all 
,  ,  ,wr R w W m M    we have 
   ,cm m mm a a a w w
a A m M w W m M
t v v d
   
        
or equivalently 
   ,cm m mm a a a w w
a A m M w W m M
C t v v d
   
        (15) 
where a aa A u v   is the unique (due to unique ,  av a A ) total toll revenue generated 
from all classes of user in the network, and the minimum travel cost ,cmw  for each class 
between each OD pair is also unique. Since ,cmw  and   are unique at equilibrium, (15) 
means that system cost C  is unique. 
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In summary, we have the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. At traffic equilibrium under a toll scheme u , the path flow f  and the 
class-specific link flow Mv  are generally not unique, while the aggregate link flow v  and 
the system disutilities, T  and C , are all unique. 
 
 
Figure 1. Pareto optimal frontier of nonconvex bi-objective problem (16) 
 
 
3. Bi-criteria Pareto system optimum and Pareto optimal link toll 
 
As mentioned before, both system time T  and system cost C  are meaningful measure of 
system performance. Nevertheless, previous researches on network pricing optimization 
typically consider only minimization of either T  or C  (Yang and Huang, 2004). Here we 
shall consider minimization of T  and C  simultaneously. Thus we have the following 
bi-objective minimization problem, which combines the two SO problems (6) and (7). 
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 
 
 
 min  β
a a a
a A
m
m a a a
a A m M
t v vT
C t v v


 
           

f
f
f
  (16) 
Instead of seeking for optimal flow patterns of minimizing T  or C , this bi-objective 
problem (16) is to seek for a Pareto optimal solution set, which determines a Pareto optimal 
frontier of the two objective values. As an illustration, Figure 1 plots a typical Pareto optimal 
frontier (also referred to as “efficient frontier”) for problem (16) in the  ,T C  
two-dimensional space. It should be mentioned that the feasible region of the objective value 
 ,T C  is generally nonconvex due to the nonconvexity of  C f  (Yang and Huang, 2005; 
Engelson and Lindberg, 2006). 
 
As seen in Figure 1, the Pareto optimal frontier of problem (16) is the left-lower part of the 
boundary of the feasible region of  ,T C , with the time-based SO and the cost-based SO 
being the two endpoints of the frontier. At each point on the Pareto optimal frontier (including 
the two SO points), neither T  nor C  can be further reduced without increasing the other 
one. Thus each point on the Pareto optimal frontier represents a bi-criteria system optimum, 
and is referred to as a Pareto system optimum (or shortly, Pareto optimum). A feasible flow 
pattern that gives a Pareto optimum is said to be a Pareto optimal flow pattern, and its 
mathematical definition is given as follows. 
 
Definition 1. A flow pattern P f  is said to be Pareto optimal if there does not exist 
another flow pattern f  such that    PT Tf f ,    PC Cf f , and at least one of 
   PT Tf f  and    PC Cf f  holds. 
 
The simplest way to solve bi-objective problem (16) is the so called weighted sum method, 
i.e. to solve a single objective problem as follows. 
    1 2min  T C   f f f   (17) 
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With different nonnegative weights 1  and 2 , problem (17) leads to different Pareto 
optima. Nonetheless, it is well known (e.g. Miettinen, 1999) that the weighted sum method 
may not be able to solve for every Pareto optimum when the multi-objective problem is 
nonconvex, as is the case of our bi-objective problem (16). As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
objective contour lines of the weighted-sum problem (17) are straight lines in the  ,T C  
two-dimensional space. Setting different values to 1  and 2  only changes the slope of the 
contour line. Whatever combination of  1 2,   or whatever slope of contour line is adopted, 
some points on the Pareto optimal frontier (the concave part, as shown in Figure 2) can never 
be optimal to the weighted-sum minimization problem (17). This means that some Pareto 
optima can never be obtained by the weighted sum method. 
 
 
Figure 2. Weighted sum method for nonconvex bi-objective problem (16) 
 
For a nonconvex multi-objective problem, several methods are available for finding every 
Pareto optimum (Miettinen, 1999). Here we shall use the so called  -constraint method to 
solve our nonconvex bi-objective minimization problem (16). In this method, one objective 
function is selected to be optimized and the other objective function is converted into a 
constraint by setting an upper bound. Specifically, we shall solve the following problem. 
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  min  Cf f   (18) 
subject to 
   TT  f   (19) 
where T  is a predefined upper bound of the system time. As illustrated in Figure 3, by 
setting different values to T , each point on the Pareto optimal frontier can be obtained. 
 
 
Figure 3.  -constraint method for nonconvex bi-objective problem (16) 
 
After introducing the bi-criteria Pareto system optimum, we are now interested in the 
following question: can we always find positive anonymous link tolls to induce a Pareto 
system optimum? For the two special cases of Pareto optimum, i.e. the respective time-based 
SO and cost-based SO, the answer is positive as shown in Yang and Huang (2004). In 
particular, Yang and Huang (2004) constructed a primal-dual pair of linear programming 
problems to obtain the set of nonnegative anonymous link toll patterns which can induce the 
time-based SO. In this section we first generalize their method of “primal-dual LP” to any 
feasible target link flow pattern and then apply the method to our Pareto system optimum. 
 
3.1 Decentralization of a given feasible target link flow pattern 
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For a given feasible target link flow ( , )av a A v , we consider the following linear 
programming (LP) problem: 
  min  mm a a a
a A m M
t v v  
 f   (20) 
subject to 
 
w
m
rw ar a
w W r R m M
f v
  
    , a A   (21) 
In words, constraint (21) means that the aggregate link flow should be v . Thus LP (20)-(21) 
is to minimize the system cost with respect to class-specific path and link flows subject to the 
aggregate link flow being equal to v . 
 
In view of the constraint set f  defined in (5), the dual formulation of LP (20)-(21) is: 
 
,
max  m ma a w w
a A w W m M
v d
  
    λ μ   (22) 
subject to 
   ,  ,  ,  mw a ar m a a ar w
a A a A
t v r R w W m M
 
            (23) 
where the dual variables  ,a a A  λ  and  , ,mw w W m M   μ  are associated with 
the equality constraints (21) and the OD flow conservation constraint in (5), respectively, and 
a  and mw  are unrestricted in sign. Note that the set of feasible solutions to LP (20)-(21) is 
not empty because v  is a feasible link flow pattern. Thus both the primal and dual LP have 
solutions. 
 
Let au  replace ( )a , a A  and rewrite (23) as 
    ,  ,  ,  mm a a a ar w w
a A
t v u r R w W m M

         (24) 
According to the duality theory, at the optimal points of the primal and dual LP, the following 
complementary slackness conditions hold: 
    0,  ,  ,  m mm a a a ar w rw w
a A
t v u f r R w W m M

            (25) 
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    0,  ,  ,  mm a a a ar w w
a A
t v u r R w W m M

         (26) 
Observe that the optimality conditions (25)-(26) are simply the cost-based UE conditions (12)
-(13), with mw  rewritten as ,m cw . This equivalence between the LP optimality conditions 
and the UE conditions immediately leads to the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1. Any feasible target link flow pattern can be supported as a multi-class UE link 
flow pattern by anonymous link tolls which can be positive or negative. 
 
Proof: For any feasible link flow ( , )av a A v , we can construct the primal-dual pair of LP 
(20)-(21) and (22)-(23), both having solutions and thus having optimal solutions. Consider a 
pair of primal-dual optimal solutions f  and  ,λ μ , and let  u λ  be a toll scheme. Then 
f , u  and μ  satisfy the optimality conditions (25)-(26), which are just the UE conditions 
under toll scheme  u λ , thus f  is a UE path flow and v  is the UE link flow under toll 
scheme  u λ . Therefore, v  is supported as a UE link flow by toll scheme  u λ . 
Because a  is unrestricted in sign, toll scheme  u λ  can have positive and negative link 
tolls. This completes the proof.     ♦ 
 
Theorem 1 requires that link tolls can be “positive or negative”. Yang and Huang (2004) 
showed the existence of positive link tolls to decentralize a cost or time-based SO link flow 
pattern into a multi-class UE, but this conclusion can not be generalized to any feasible link 
flow pattern that may have to resort to negative link tolls. Even in the case of homogeneous 
users, negative link toll is sometimes necessary to induce a feasible link flow pattern, as 
shown in Bai et al. (2006) by a simple example. 
 
Once an aggregate link flow pattern is given, the system time is uniquely determined, 
nevertheless, the system cost is undetermined but dependent on the class-specific link flows 
that constitute the given aggregate link flows. Fortunately, if an anonymous tolling scheme is 
implemented to support a target link flow v  as a multi-class UE flow, the resulting UE 
class-specific flow f  solves LP (20)-(21) for given v  (as the UE conditions are equivalent 
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to the LP optimality conditions), which means that f  minimizes the system cost under v . 
To sum up, we have 
 
Lemma 2. Under any anonymous link toll scheme that decentralizes a given feasible 
aggregate link flow pattern, the resulting class-specific UE flows minimize the system cost 
associated with the given aggregate link flow pattern. 
 
The intuition behind this lemma is that, under any anonymous link toll scheme, users with 
higher VOT tend to choose routes with lower travel times by paying higher toll charges, thus 
the system cost, C , which is exclusive of toll charge and given as the sum of the travel times 
of all user classes weighted by their VOT, is naturally minimized. The implication of the 
lemma is that, when analyzing congestion charge in the presence of user heterogeneity, we 
shall concentrate on the aggregate link flow rather than the class-specific flow, because the 
latter is self-optimized by the anonymous link tolls. 
 
3.2 Existence of nonnegative anonymous link tolls for a given Pareto system optimum 
 
After establishing Theorem 1 for decentralizing any feasible target link flow pattern with 
anonymous positive or negative link tolls, we now turn our attention to a Pareto optimum of 
the bi-objective system optimization problem. First note that, although applied for any 
feasible target link flow pattern, Theorem 1 can not be simply said to be valid for a Pareto 
system optimum, because the solution to bi-objective minimization problem (16) is defined 
and determined by the class-specific path and link flow rather than the aggregate link flow 
only. Thus we are left with the following question: when we use anonymous link tolls to 
decentralize the aggregate link flow of a Pareto system optimum, whether the class-specific 
UE path and link flow under the given toll scheme is Pareto optimal. The answer is positive 
as stated in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3. A Pareto system optimum is supported as a multi-class UE by an anonymous link 
toll scheme if the toll scheme induces the aggregate link flow of the Pareto system optimum. 
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Proof: Consider a Pareto optimal flow f  and the corresponding aggregate link flow v . Let 
u  be an anonymous link toll scheme under which the aggregate UE link flow is v . It 
suffices to prove that the class-specific UE path flow f  (generally non-unique) under toll 
scheme u  gives    T Tf f  and    C Cf f . Since both f  and f  have the same 
aggregate link flow v , we have    T Tf f . Because f  is a UE flow,  C f  is the 
minimum system cost under link flow v  from Lemma 2, thus we have    C Cf f , 
which simply means    C Cf f , because    C Cf f  contradicts that f  is Pareto 
optimal. This completes the proof.     ♦ 
 
Note that Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 already ensure the existence of anonymous link tolls to 
induce a Pareto system optimum. We now further prove the existence of nonnegative 
anonymous link tolls. This is meaningful because negative tolls (subsidies) on road networks 
are difficult and seldom implemented by policy makers in reality. 
 
Theorem 2. A Pareto system optimum can be supported as a multi-class UE by 
nonnegative anonymous link tolls. 
 
Proof: Consider a Pareto optimal flow f , and let v  be the corresponding aggregate link 
flow. With Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that there exists a nonnegative anonymous link toll 
scheme u  under which the UE link flow is v . To do this, for the given link flow v , we 
construct a modified version of the primal LP (20)-(21) with the equality constraint (21) 
replaced by the following inequality constraint 
 
w
m
rw ar a
w W r R m M
f v
  
    , a A   (27) 
Because constraint (27) is a simple relaxation of constraint (21) and other constraints remain 
unchanged, the feasible region of the new LP is expanded and hence nonempty. This means 
that the new LP and its dual LP have solutions. The new dual formulation is given by (22)
-(23) adding an additional constraint 
 0a  , a A   (28) 
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where  ,a a A  λ  is associated with the inequality constraint (27). Let f  and  ,λ μ  
be a pair of primal-dual optimal solutions to this new pair of primal-dual LP. Then  u λ  is 
a nonnegative link toll scheme because of constraint (28), and it still holds that f , u  and μ  
satisfy the optimality conditions (25)-(26). We only need to prove that the optimality 
conditions (25)-(26) are still equivalent to the UE conditions under toll scheme  u λ . It 
suffices to prove that the aggregate link flow of f  is v , i.e. constraint (27) is binding at the 
optimum solution f . 
 
Suppose constraint (27) is not binding at the optimum solution f , i.e. the aggregate link flow 
of f  is v  such that v v  and b bv v  for some b A . Then by the monotonicity of the 
link cost function we have    b b b bt v t v ,    m mb b b b b bt v v t v v  for  m M , and 
   b b b b b bt v v t v v . Then we have 
    a a a a a a
a A a A
t v v t v v
 
    (29) 
    m mm a a a m a a a
a A m M a A m M
t v v t v v
   
      (30) 
Note that (29) is simply    T Tf f . Also, because f  solves the new primal LP with 
objective function (20) subject to constraint (27), and f  is within the feasible region of this 
new LP, it holds readily that the objective value of f  is not larger than that of f , namely 
    m mm a a a m a a a
a A m M a A m M
t v v t v v
   
     (31) 
Combining (30) and (31) yields    m mm a a a m a a aa A m M a A m Mt v v t v v         , which is 
   C Cf f . Thus we have both    T Tf f  and    C Cf f , which contradicts that 
f  is Pareto optimal. This completes the proof.     ♦ 
 
 
4. Bounding system performance deviation 
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In this section we shall explore the maximum extent to which the system performances vary 
when alternative Pareto system optimum is considered. Specifically, let Pf  denote a Pareto 
optimal flow, and Tf  and Cf  be the time-based and the cost-based SO flows, respectively. 
Further, let minT  and minC  denote the minimum possible system time and system cost that 
are realized, respectively, at time-based and cost-based SO, i.e.  min TT T f  and 
 min CC C f . For a given Pareto optimal flow Pf , we are interested in knowing how far the 
system disutilities  PC f  and  PT f  could be deviated from their minima, minC  and minT , 
respectively. 
 
To measure the deviation, we define the following two ratios, called system performance 
deviation factors: 
       minT T
T T
T T
  f ff
f
,       minC C
C C
C C
  f ff
f
 (32) 
Clearly,   1T f  and   1C f  for any feasible f . Particularly, let *T  and *C  
denote the values of the two factors when Cf f  and Tf f , respectively: 
     * min
C C
T
T
T T
T T
  f f
f
,     * min
T T
C
C
C C
C C
  f f
f
 (33) 
*
T  measures the deviation of the system time at a cost-based SO from its minimum achieved 
at a time-based SO; conversely, *C  measures the deviation of the system cost at a 
time-based SO from its minimum achieved at a cost-based SO. Furthermore, *T  and *C  
are the upper bounds of  T P f  and  C P f  for any Pareto optimal flow Pf , as given in 
the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 4. For any Pareto optimal flow Pf , we have  T P T  f  and  C P C  f . 
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Proof: By definitions (32)-(33),  T P T  f  is equivalent to    P CT Tf f , which holds 
for a simple reason: if    P CT Tf f , then we have    C PT Tf f  and    C PC Cf f , 
which contradicts that Pf  is Pareto optimal. Similarly,  C P C  f  holds.     ♦ 
 
For illustration of the two factors *T  and *C , Figure 4 plots the Pareto optimal frontier in 
the rescaled  ,T C  two-dimensional space, where the x-axis value is minT T T   and the 
y-axis value is minC C C  . The origin of this rescaled  ,T C  space is set to point  1,1 , 
which represents the ideal case that both T  and C  are minimized simultaneously. The 
ideal case can be realized when users are homogeneous. In this rescaled  ,T C  space, each 
Pareto optimum     ,P PT Cf f  is represented by the point     ,T P C P f f , and in 
particular, the two points  *1, C  and  * ,1T  represent the time-based and the cost-based 
SO, respectively. From Lemma 4, each Pareto optimum is upper bounded by point  * *,T C  , 
thus the Pareto optimal frontier as a whole is upper bounded by point  * *,T C   and confined 
within a rectangular, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Now we move on to look into the bound properties of the two factors *T  and *C . We first 
define the following terms and introduce a lemma. 
  min min ,m m M    , the minimum VOT among all user classes; 
 m mw m w wm M m Md d     , the average VOT of all users between OD pair w W ; 
  max max ,w w W    , the maximum OD-average VOT among all OD pairs; 
  max max ,m m M    , the minimum VOT among all user classes. 
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Evidently, min max max     . 
 
 
Figure 4. Pareto optimal frontier in rescaled  ,T C  space 
 
Lemma 5. Let f  be a UE flow under an anonymous link toll scheme, then it holds 
      min maxT C T   f f f  (34) 
 
Proof: Because    minT C f f  holds trivially, here we only prove    maxC T f f . Let 
f  be a UE flow under anonymous link toll scheme u , then the UE conditions hold, and it 
follows from the cost-based UE conditions (12)-(13) that 
  ,cmw a ar m a a ar
a A a A
u t v
 
       , wr R , w W , m M  (35) 
Multiplying both sides of (35) by equilibrium path flow mrw rwm Mf f  aggregated over all 
user classes and summing over all wr R , we have 
  ,c
w w w
m
w rw a rw ar m a a rw ar
r R a A r R a A r R
f u f t v f
    
          , w W , m M  (36) 
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Denote 
w
m
w rw wr R m M
d f d     and , wa w rw arr Rv f  , then (36) becomes 
  ,c , ,mw w a a w m a a a w
a A a A
d u v t v v
 
     , w W , m M  (37) 
Multiplying both sides of (37) by mw wd d  and summing over all m M , we have 
  ,c , ,m mw w a a w w a a a w
m M a A a A
d u v t v v
  
      , w W  (38) 
Since  max max ,w w W    , (38) can be relaxed to 
  ,c , max ,m mw w a a w a a a w
m M a A a A
d u v t v v
  
      , w W  (39) 
Taking summation of (39) over all w W , we obtain 
  ,c maxm mw w a a a a a
w W m M a A a A
d u v t v v
   
         
which is simply 
  ,c maxm mw w
w W m M
d T
 
     f   (40) 
The left-hand side of (40) is equal to  C f  as mentioned in (15), thus we have 
   maxC T f f . This completes the proof.     ♦ 
 
The following theorem gives an upper bound of the product of the two factors *T  and *C . 
 
Theorem 3. It holds that 
 * * max max
min min
T C
        (41) 
 
Proof: The second inequality follows from the definitions of max  and max . By definition 
(33), we have 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 * * C CT TT C T C C T
T TC C
T C C T
         
f ff f
f f f f
 (42) 
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Lemma 5 applies to Tf  and Cf , respectively, because there exist anonymous link toll 
schemes that can support the time-based and the cost-based SO as UE. Then, by applying 
Lemma 5 to Cf , we have    min C CT C f f , which gives 
    min
1C
C
T
C
 
f
f
  (43) 
Apply Lemma 5 to Tf , we have    maxT TC T f f , which gives 
    maxTT
C
T
 f
f
  (44) 
Substituting (43) and (44) into (42) gives (41).    ♦ 
 
 
Figure 5. Graphical representation of Theorem 3 in rescaled  ,T C  space 
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In view of 1T
   and 1C  , Theorem 3 gives rise to max minT    , max minC     
and   max minmin ,T C      . Thus max min   or max min   can be regarded as an 
upper bound on the system performance discrepancy when optimization is based on different 
(time vs cost) criteria. Figure 5 gives a graphical representation of Theorem 3 in the rescaled 
 ,T C  two-dimensional space. The bold line ( max minT C     ) together with the two axes 
constitutes a bounding region of point  ,T C   , which in turn gives a bounding rectangular 
of the Pareto optimal frontier (see Figure 4). 
 
The bound information on the two factors *T  and *C  given in Theorem 3 is independent 
of network topology and link travel time functions, but solely dependent upon VOT 
distribution, or more specifically, on max min  , the ratio of the highest OD-average VOT 
among all OD pairs to the lowest VOT among all user classes. Here two remarks are ready. 
We can use the above tighter upper bounds if the information of the average VOT of users 
between each OD pair is available, otherwise we can replace max  with max . Second, when 
users are homogeneous, we readily have max max min     , then Theorem 3 gives the 
expected result of 1T C
     , which means that the time-based and the cost-based system 
optimizations coincide with each other (independent of the unit for system performance 
measure). 
 
Here, we give a numerical example to show the Pareto optimal frontier and demonstrate the 
difference between the time-based and the cost-based SO cases. Consider a simple network 
consisting of 4 nodes and 5 links, as illustrated in Figure 6. The link travel time functions are 
given in the figure: link 3 4  has an increasing travel time function, and the other 4 links 
have constant link travel times for simplicity. There are two OD pairs: 
 OD pair 1 4 , demand 1 2.6d   with VOT 1 1  ; 
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 OD pair 2 4 , demand 2 2.0d   with VOT 2 4  . 
 
 
41 0.15x  
1 
1 
25 
40 
1 
2 
3 4 
 
 
Figure 6. Network of numerical example 
 
Let 1f  and 2f  be the flows on link 1 3  and link 2 3 , respectively. Then, due to 
simplicity of the network, vector  1 2,f ff  effectively represents a class-specific traffic 
assignment, and the feasible flow set is  1 1 2 2: 0 ,0f d f d     f . Solving the 
time-based SO problem gives 
    1,0 2.6,0T d f , with min 73.0T   and   223.0TC f  
Solving the cost-based SO problem gives 
    20, 0, 2C d f , with min 139.2C   and   112.8CT f  
Thus we have 
 112.8 1.55
73.0T
    and 223.0 1.60
139.2C
    
Furthermore, solving the  -constraint problem (18)-(19) with the T  value increasing from 
min 73.0T   to   112.8CT f , we can solve for every Pareto optimum and thereby obtain the 
Pareto optimal frontier. Figure 7 plots the Pareto optimal frontier in the rescaled  ,T C  
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two-dimensional space. The point    , 1.55,1.60T C     and its theoretical bounding curve 
( 2 1 4.0T C      ) based on Theorem 3 are also displayed in Figure 7 for comparison. 
 
 
Figure 7. Numerical example results in rescaled  ,T C  space 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
For a traffic network with heterogeneous users and fixed demand, system time and system 
cost are two meaningful measures of system performance. Thus, there are two objectives of 
network optimization, i.e. to minimize system time and to minimize system cost. This paper 
considered these two objectives simultaneously by introducing a bi-objective minimization 
problem and exploring bi-criteria Pareto optimum. We proved that a bi-criteria Pareto 
optimum can always be supported as a multi-class UE by positive anonymous link tolls. We 
also observe that: when dealing with pricing optimization with heterogeneous users, it 
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suffices to concentrate on the aggregate link flows rather than the class-specific path or link 
flows, because the latter will be automatically optimized by the anonymous link toll schemes. 
 
In an attempt to understand how system cost and system time vary with alternative Pareto 
system optimum including the time-based and the cost-based SO cases, we introduced two 
system performance deviation factors and established a meaningful upper bound of their 
product. The upper bound is solely determined by users’ VOT distribution, i.e. the ratio of the 
highest to the lowest VOT among all user classes. It should be mentioned that these results 
are independent of network topology and travel time functions. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The research described here was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. HKUST6215/06E). 
 
 
References 
 
Bai, L., Hearn, D.W. and Lawphongpanich, S., 2006. Relaxed toll sets for congestion pricing 
problems. In: “Mathematical and Computational Models for Congestion Charging”, 
Applied Optimization 101, 23-44. 
Dial, R.B., 1999a. Network-optimized road pricing Part 1: a parable and a model. 
Transportation Science 47 (1), 54-64. 
Dial, R.B., 1999b. Network-optimized road pricing Part 2: algorithms and examples. 
Transportation Science 47 (2), 327-336. 
Engelson, L. and Lindberg P.O., 2006. Congestion pricing of road networks with users having 
different time values. In: “Mathematical and Computational Models for Congestion 
Charging”, Applied Optimization 101, 81-104. 
Leurent, F., 1993. Cost versus time equilibrium over a network. European Journal of 
Operational Research 71 (2), 205-221. 
Marcotte, P. and Zhu, D.L., 2000. Equilibria with infinitely many differentiated classes of 
 
Final version submitted to Transportation Research Part B for publication on 11 September 2008 
26 
customers. In: Complementarity and Variational Problems - tate of the Art (eds., Ferris 
MC and Pang JS). SIAM, Philadelphia, PA. 
Mayet, J. and Hansen, M., 2000. Congestion pricing with continuously distributed values of 
time. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 34 (3), 359-370. 
Miettinen, K.M., 1999. Nonlinear Multiobjective Optimization. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Massachusetts, USA. 
Nagurney, A., 2000a. A multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium model. 
Mathematical and Computer Modeling 32 (3-4), 393-411. 
Nagurney, A., 2000b. Congested urban transportation networks and emission paradoxes. 
Transportation Research Part D 5 (2) , 145-151. 
Yang, H. and Huang, H.J., 2004. The multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium 
and system optimum problem. Transportation Research Part B 38 (1), 1-15. 
Yang, H. and Huang, H.J., 2005. Mathematical and Economic Theory of Road Pricing.  
Elsevier, Oxford, UK. 
Yang, H. and Zhang, X.N., 2002. Multi-class network toll design problem with social and 
spatial equity constraints. Journal of Transportation Engineering 128 (5), ASCE, 420-428. 
Yin, Y. and Lawphongpanich, S., 2006. Internalizing emission externality on road networks. 
Transportation Research Part D 11 (4), 292-301. 
 
